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ABSTRACT
Image classification is vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
This work investigates the robustness of Saak transform
against adversarial attacks towards high performance image
classification. We develop a complete image classification
system based on multi-stage Saak transform. In the Saak
transform domain, clean and adversarial images demonstrate
different distributions at different spectral dimensions. Selec-
tion of the spectral dimensions at every stage can be viewed
as an automatic denoising process. Motivated by this observa-
tion, we carefully design strategies of feature extraction, rep-
resentation and classification that increase adversarial robust-
ness. The performances with well-known datasets and attacks
are demonstrated by extensive experimental evaluations.
Index Terms— Saak transform, Adversarial attacks, Deep
Neural Networks, Image Classification
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that deep learning based approach for
image classification is vulnerable to adversarial attacks [1].
These attacks come in the form of adversarial inputs with
carefully crafted perturbations added to the input samples.
Such perturbations are small and imperceptible to humans,
but can drastically cause the classification systems to misin-
terpret adversarial inputs, with potentially disastrous conse-
quences where safety and security are crucial.
Saak (Subspace approximation with augmented kernels)
transform, inspired by deep learning mechanism, is a new
mathematical transform that is completely interpretable [2, 3].
The Saak transform is a variant of principal component anal-
ysis (PCA) that splits the positive and negative responses into
two separate channels by kernel augmentation and resolves
”sign confusion” ambiguity. This process facilitates the cas-
cade of Saak transforms called multi-stage Saak transforms.
Saak features at later stages have larger receptive fields, yet
they are obtained in a one-pass feed-forward manner without
any supervision and back propagation. In addition, inverse
of Saak transform is possible, which allows the Saak feature
representations to be transformed back to the image space for
clearly visualizing, analyzing, and interpreting.
Saak transform has demonstrated its superior performance
and utility in classifying hand-written digits under various
noisy environments [4]. Furthermore, Saak transform has also
been employed as a pre-processing step in image classifica-
tion pipeline to defend adversarial attack [5].
In this work, we investigate the robustness of Saak trans-
form against adversarial attacks towards high performance
image classification. We develop a complete image classi-
fication system based on multi-stage Saak transform. We take
advantage of the ocean of Saak coefficients available at ev-
ery stage of multi-stage Saak transform. Careful selection
of these features using cross-entropy leads us build a new
Saak feature representation. The whole feature extraction and
selection process is completely transparent and of extremely
low complexity. In the Saak transform domain, clean and ad-
versarial images demonstrate different distributions at differ-
ent spectral dimensions. Selection of the spectral dimensions
at every stage can be viewed as an automatic denoising pro-
cess. Motivated by this observation, we design new strategies
of feature extraction, representation and classification that in-
crease adversarial robustness. The performances with well-
known benchmark datasets and attacks are demonstrated by
extensive experimental results.
2. RELATED WORK
One of the most interesting explorations in defense against
adversarial attacks is done through adversarial training [6].
This aims in augmenting adversarial samples along with clean
samples for simultaneous training. While these methods help
in defending against particular adversarial attacks for which it
is trained for, they fail to generalize. Also, this type of training
takes longer time for convergence, hence needs to be trained
for more epochs.
Adversarial detection involves detection of an adversar-
ial sample before passing through the network. Adversarial
samples can be detected using statistical tests [7], estimating
Bayesian uncertainty [8], using noise reduction methods like
scalar quantization and spatial smoothing filter [9]. Though
these methods pave way to a good adversarial sample detec-
tion problem, these detectors still possess the risk of being
fooled by the attacker.
Pre-processing based methods perform certain transforma-
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tions on inputs to nullify the effect of adversarial attacks.
Some examples are image cropping and rescaling, JPEG
compression [10], feature squeezing by Bit-Depth-Reduction
[11], and Total Variance Minimization [12]. Nonlinear, sat-
urating neural networks are used in [13]. Gradient masking
effect applies regularizers or smooth labels to attain output
less sensitive to perturbed input [14].
Use of knowledge distillation when training networks can
be used as defense against adversarial samples [15]. Rein-
forcement of network structure by using bounded ReLU acti-
vations help in enhancing stability to adversarial perturbations
[16]. Pixel defend is used as an image purification process, as
described in [17].
[5] applies lossy Saak transform to adversarially perturbed
images as a pre-processing tool to defend against adversarial
attacks. The method is based on the observation that outputs
of Saak transform are very discriminative in differentiating
adversarial examples from clean ones. Instead of using Saak
transform as pre-processing tool, we apply multi-stage Saak
transform to build a complete image classification pipeline
and design new strategies of feature selection, representation
and classification to defend against adversarial attacks.
3. SAAK TRANSFORM APPROACH
The Saak transform defines a mapping from a real-valued
function defined on a three-dimensional cuboid consisting of
spatial and spectral dimensions to a one-dimensional rectified
spectral vector. It is presented as a new feature representa-
tion method. It consists of two main ideas: subspace approx-
imation and kernel augmentation. For the former, we build
the optimal linear subspace approximation to the original sig-
nal space via PCA or the truncated Karhunen-Love Transform
(KLT) [18]. For the latter, we augment each transform kernel
with its negative and apply the rectified linear unit (ReLU) to
the transform output. This is equivalent to the sign-to-position
(S/P) format conversion.
Figure 1 illustrates the developed saak transform pipeline.
Specifically, it consists of 1) Extracting Local Cuboids from
the images, 2) Obtaining KLT components, 3) Convoluting
the images with the extracted kernels, 4) Calculating the cross
entropy measures, 5) Selecting the best spatial/spectral com-
ponents. We classify adversarial images using Saak trans-
form. We extract kernels using clean images and follow the
same procedure as we classify clean images. Saak kernels
are used to extract the coefficients from attacked images. We
classify adversarial attacked images after selecting features
using our cross-entropy based method.
During the classification phase, input f is convoluted with
extracted Saak kernels to extract Saak features. Based on ker-
nel size ks, spatial resolution of feature responses reduce at
every stage. Consider block of feature responses at any stage
p for a single image as fp with dimension Dp1 ×Dp2 ×Kp.
First two dimensions represent spatial dimension along ver-
Fig. 1: Saak transform consists two modules: kernel extrac-
tion and feature extraction. We use clean training images to
extract kernels followed feature extraction. Feature responses
can used for any application.
tical and horizontal directions. The third one represents the
spectral dimension of feature responses for an image. If there
are N images in the training data, then total dimension of
feature responses can be given as N × Dp1 × Dp2 × Kp.
Cross-entropy for feature responses is calculated at every in-
dex (i, j, k), where (i, j) represents spatial location and k rep-
resents spectral dimension. Let C be the number of classes.
Entropy at every location is given by,
H =
N∑
n=1
C∑
c=1
yn,c log
1
pn,c
(1)
where
yn,c =
{
1, if fp(n, i, j, k) ∈ c
0, if fp(n, i, j, k) /∈ c
(2)
and pn,c is the probability of nth sample in class c. To ob-
tain this, feature response values at (i, j, k) location across all
images are taken. Histogram of these N values is calculated
using a certain number of bins, B. From various experiments,
we concluded that feature selection is stable irrespective of
number of bins. We choose B = 10 and proceed by getting
mc = (mc1,mc2, ...,mcB), (3)
where mci represents maximum occurring class in bin i, and
mci ∈ 1, 2, ..., C. Probability pn,c is determined as
pn,c =
∑B
i=1 1(mci = c)
B
(4)
At the end, Dp1 × Dp2 × Kp cross-entropy values will
be computed at stage p. Lower the entropy value at a lo-
cation, higher is the discriminant power. For every spectral
dimension, Dp1 × Dp2 pixels are ranked according to their
entropy. The first few pixels with lowest cross-entropy val-
ues are retained, and others are made zero. This localizes
salient regions in an image. Similarly, spatially averaged
cross-entropy for all spectral dimensions is obtained. From
these average values, spectral dimensions are ranked, and first
few K
′
p with lowest average cross-entropy values are cho-
sen. Thus spatially sparse feature responses with dimension
Dp1×Dp2×K ′p are chosen at stage p. This is repeated at all
stages of multi-stage Saak transform for classification.
4. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
We consider three major adversarial attacks, against which we
will evaluate our approach. The attacks are explained below.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [19]: This method
computes adversarial image by adding a pixel-wide perturba-
tion of magnitude in the direction of gradient. The perturba-
tion is computed by η = sign(∆xJθ(x, l)), so each pixel is
modified by x′ = x + η. This value can be computed using
back propagation. There is no bound on the modified value,
hence the quality of the adversarial image greatly decreases.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [20]: This method is an
extension of FGSM, but with a limit on the value that a pixel
can be modified. The change is limited, but the number of
iterations of the attack are increased. Hence, for human eye,
the BIM attacked images look less noisier when compared to
FGSM attacks. The adversarial images are generated after
multiple iterations.
DeepFool (DF) [21]: This attack is more carefully crafted
when compared to FGSM and BIM. It computes the closest
L2 projection distance to the decision boundary hyper-plane
of adversarial example and input image. The perturbation is
a function of the argmin of this distance. The perturbation
is applied iteratively with smaller steps, hence the produced
adversarial images do not look noisy to human eye.
The above three attacks are used to generate adversarial
images and our Saak transform based image classification are
directly applied to classify the attack images. The classifi-
cation accuracy is evaluated against following state-of-the-art
defensing techniques.
JPEG Compression [10]: It has demonstrated that sys-
tematic JPEG compression can work as an effective pre-
processing step in the classification pipeline to counter ad-
versarial attacks. An important component of JPEG com-
pression is its ability to remove high-frequency signal compo-
nents, hence reducing high-frequency components with JPEG
compression should contribute to adversarial attack removal
without hurting the decision accuracy of clean data.
Bit Depth Reduction [12]: It is one of the feature squeez-
ing techniques. Images often contain unnecessary features
that can be exploited by adversarial attacks. Using less bit to
discrete colors will make prediction more robust. The more
bit to reduce, the more features are eliminated. In this work,
two variants of bit depth reduction (4-bits and 5-bits) are used
to pre-process the attack image.
Fig. 2: (a) and (b) show the lower and higher spectral dis-
tribution of Saak coefficients extracted from CIFAR-10. At
higher dimensions, the distributions obtained from clean and
attacked images are different. (c) and (d) show the RMSE and
normalized RMSE between clean and FGSM attacked Saak
coefficients in different spectral dimensions
Non-Local Means (NL-Means) [22]: Image denoising us-
ing NL-means before classification can remove adversarial
noise and improve adversarial robustness. The NL-means not
only compares the pixel value in a single point but the ge-
ometrical configuration in a whole neighborhood. This fact
allows a more robust comparison than neighborhood filters,
improving robustness of networks against adversarial attacks.
Total Variance Minimization (TVM) [12]: In images,
noisy signals have a high total variation. TVM is an optimiza-
tion technique where the variance of the pixels are reduced
using L2 regularization. TVM retains more information such
as edges when compared to other filtering techniques.
Pixel Deflection [23]: A random pixel is replaced by an-
other random pixel in a local neighborhood. It works well
due to the assumption that adversarial attacks rely on specific
activation functions, i.e., only some pixels are manipulated to
make the attack work. There are two variations of this method
- pixel deflection with and without activation map. The acti-
vation map is used to determine the random pixel which is to
be used to replace the target pixel in consideration.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Extensive experiments are conduced on datasets MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and STL-10. We provide in-depth experimental re-
sults for adversarial images classification and prove that clas-
sification using the proposed Saak features is adversarial ro-
bust in comparison with state-of-the-art defense mechanisms.
Adversarial Defense FGSM BIM DF
No-defense 13.86% 18.95% 13%
JPEG(Q=90) 4.61% 9.52% 14.1%
Bit Depth Reduction (4-bit) 5.66% 9.65% 12.83%
Bit Depth Reduction (5-bit) 3.63% 8.87% 13.06%
Median Filtering (2x2) 4.04% 9.41% 8.77%
Median Filtering (3x3) 5.14% 10.2% 9.29%
NL-Means 5.27% 9.54% 14.52%
TVM 2.92% 8.81% 5.81%
Pixel Deflection (W/o RCAM) 4.54% 9.55% 16.44%
Pixel Deflection (W/ RCAM) 5.16% 9.63% 17.3%
Saak Transform 4.78% 5.17% 3.79%
Table 1: Robustness comparison on MNIST: The accuracy on
clean images using the modified LeNet architecture is 99.2%
and using SAAK transform is 99.4%. The value in each entry
of the table is the drop in classification accuracy from clean
and adversarial attacked images.
In the Saak transform domain, clean and adversarial im-
ages demonstrate different distributions at different spectral
dimensions. Figure 2 shows distribution of Saak components
belonging to first few spectral dimensions, followed by the
distribution for higher spectral dimensions. Saak spectral
components differ for both clean and adversarial images at
higher dimension. We also show the normalized and the orig-
inal RMSE (root-mean-squared-error) values between clean
and FGSM adversarial samples in different spectral compo-
nents. We can observe from Figure 2 (c) and (d) that clean
and adversarial samples have different Saak coefficient val-
ues in high spectral dimensions. These results were obtained
from first stage Saak transform of CIFAR-10 images using
3× 3 local cuboids.
We classify adversarial images using Saak transform. We
extract kernels using clean images and follow the same proce-
dure as we classify clean images. As shown in Figure 1 Saak
kernels are used to extract the coefficients from attacked im-
ages. We classify adversarial attacked images after selecting
features using cross-entropy based method.
Table 1 shows extensive comparison results of our Saak
transform based classification for various attacked MNIST
dataset with other state-of-art defense methods. The values
across the table indicate the drop in classification accuracy
from clean and adversarial attacked images, i.e. drop in clas-
sification accuracy ∆ = Cclean − Cattact. Lower the drop
value is, better is the robustness of the classification model.
Similarly Tables 2 and 3 shows the results for CIFAR-10 and
STL-10 datasets.
From the results we can see our approach outperforms
other adversarial defense methods. The classification accu-
racy drop for Saak transform features is very less, thanks for
robustness of Saak transform to adversarial perturbations. As
previously stated, the images classified with Saak transform
are not subjected to any specially-crafted adversarial defense
Adversarial Defense FGSM BIM DF
No-defense 83.95% 83.95% 83.95%
JPEG(Q=90) 74.69% 76.26% 2.97%
Bit Depth Reduction (4-bit) 82.08% 82.94% 60.35%
Bit Depth Reduction (5-bit) 81.95% 82.93% 60.8%
Median Filtering (2x2) 77.87% 77.19% 71.03%
Median Filtering (3x3) 82.55% 78.44% 79.99%
NL-Means 77.41% 75.27% 3.15%
TVM 76.18% 76.49% 72.35%
Pixel Deflection (W/o RCAM) 83.02% 83.61% 60.06%
Pixel Deflection (W/ RCAM) 82.8% 83.67% 60.01%
Saak Transform 25.1% 26.1% 4.16%
Table 2: Robustness comparison on CIFAR-10: The accu-
racy on clean images using pre-trained VGG-16 is 93.95%
and using SAAK transform is 74.6%.
Adversarial Defense FGSM BIM DF
No-defense 53.4% 32.77%% 44.64%
JPEG(Q=90) 53.75% 34.39% 10.86%
Bit Depth Reduction (4-bit) 53.76% 33.21% 27.86%
Bit Depth Reduction (5-bit) 53.63% 33.03% 24.86%
Median Filtering (2x2) 53.22% 34.91% 28.94%
Median Filtering (3x3) 53.8% 35.08% 27.30%
NL-Means 53.79% 34.24% 22.94%
TVM 52.53% 31.72% 30.90%
Pixel Deflection (W/o RCAM) 53.46% 32.26% 27.54%
Pixel Deflection (W/ RCAM) 53.5% 32.25% 25.90%
Saak Transform 15.36% 12.5% 4.55%
Table 3: Robustness comparison on STL-10: The accuracy
on clean images using pre-trained network is 74.86% and us-
ing SAAK transform is 63.5%.
method. The drop obtained for Deepfool attacked images is
less when compared to the other attacks. For the MNIST
dataset, Saak transform classification accuracy drop is lower
than all other defenses for all the three attacks. Also the range
of drop is much lesser for MNIST when compared to CIFAR-
10 and STL-10, mainly because the attacks are more effective
in complex datasets. Even in the complex datasets, the drop
in accuracy using Saak features is less and much lower than
most of the defenses. The results clearly show that adversar-
ial perturbations can be effectively and efficiently defended
using state-of-the-art Saak transform.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the robustness of Saak transform against
adversarial attacks without using any additional overhead to
remove adversarial noise from images. We apply multi-
stage Saak transform to build a complete image classifica-
tion pipeline and carefully design each steps of feature selec-
tion, representation and classification to increase adversarial
robustness. Extensive experimental evaluations demonstrate
the benefits and utilities of Saak transform.
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